Protection from Government Disclosure by Kuhl, Carolyn B.
PROTECTION FROM GOVERNMENT DISCLOSURE-
THE REVERSE-FOIA SUIT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is designed to establish
"a general philosophy of full agency disclosure. and to provide a
court procedure by which citizens and the press may obtain information
wrongfully withheld."2 At the same time, however, the drafters of the
FOIA did not wholly ignore the privacy interests of persons who submit
information to government agencies. Congressional committee reports
regarding the FOIA recognize the necessity of "protect[ingj certain
equally important rights of privacy with respect to certain information in
Government files, such as medical and personnel records" and the
propriety of allowing such confidentiality as is necessary for operation of
the Government.'
Congress's weighing of a "philosophy of full agency disclosure"
against citizens' privacy interests resulted in an act which requires a
sweepingly broad disclosure of identifiable agency records on request of
extra-governmental parties,4 but which exempts certain categories of
agency materials from the provisions of the Act generally. 5 Hence,
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
K. DAvis, ADm STRATIvE LAw TEXT (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvis,TEXT];
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Actions: The Need for
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Parties De-
fendant, 68 MicH. L. REv. 387 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cramton].
1. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 1976).
2. S. Rm,. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (emphasis added); accord, H.R.
REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) ("LThe Act is to] provide a true Federal
public records statute by requiring the availability, to any member of the public, of all
of the executive branch records described in its requirements, except those involving mat-
ters which are within nine stated exemptions.").
3. S. REp. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); accord, H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966):
It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance between the right
of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information
in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.
The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government is op-
erating can be just as important to him as his right to privacy and his right
to confide in his Government. This bill strikes a balance considering all these
interests. Id. at 6.
4. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (Supp. 1976), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). The
broadest disclosure requirement of the FOIA provides: "[E]ach agency, upon any re-
quest for records... made in accordance with published rules... shall make the rec-
ords promptly available to any person." Id. § 552(a) (3).
5. This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
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while the FOIA provides an enforcement mechanism through which the
federal courts may order an agency to produce records improperly
withheld from a complaining party,6 the courts have consistently held
that the agency is not required to release information falling within one
of the Act's exemptions.7
Recently, private parties who have submitted allegedly confidential
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and,
in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority
in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a
lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information
furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative tech-
niques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Supp. 1976), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
Among other provisions of the FOIA are requirements that agencies publish de-
scriptions of their organization and methods of operation, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (1970),
and make available a public index of documents related to specified agency actions. 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. 1976).
6. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (4) (B) (Supp. 1976).
7. See, e.g., FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975) (nondisclosure
permitted by statutory exemption); Center for Nat'l Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502
F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (nondisclosure justified by investigatory files exemption);
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974) (nondisclosure under per-
sonnel and medical files exemption).
More accurately, release of exempt information is not required by the FOIA itself.
Plaintiffs seeking to obtain agency records still have available such means as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which may require disclosure of information deemed FOIA-
exempt. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889
(1972) (court's decision to deny disclosure under FOIA does not mean plaintiffs may
not obtain information through discovery under Federal Rules). Moreover, courts may
order certain portions of an exempt document deleted so as to render the remainder sub-
ject to disclosure. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FrC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) (identifying details or secret matters may -be deleted from
document to render it subject to disclosure); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp.
467, 471 (D.D.C. 1972) (court may order identifying material deleted from document
and then order disclosure).
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information to the government have attempted to advance their recog-
nized right of privacy under the FOIA one step further to prevent the
release of such information by the government.8 These attempts have
arisen in the context of a suit brought by a private party to enjoin an
agency from voluntarily releasing information to a third party when the
material involved arguably falls within one of the Act's exemptions-the
"reverse-FOIA" action. The theory of such an action is that, when
information falls within an exemption and its release would harm the
party which submitted that information, the agency is not merely per-
mitted to withhold the data but is prohibited from disclosing it.
Of course, since the FOIA requires that agency records falling
outside one of its exemptions must be released at the request of a party,9
the first step in obtaining any such relief is to show that the information
involved is in fact within one of the Act's exemptions. Beyond this,
however, judicial response to reverse-FOIA suits has been widely varied.
The circumstances which prompt a reverse-FOIA action and the
privacy interests involved are well illustrated by the facts of a case'"
brought by the owner of a nursing home. In order to comply with the
Medicare program, the home had been required to submit yearly cost
reports to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. When a
local competitior took advantage of the opportunity offered by the
FOIA by formally requesting that HEW release to him the nursing
home's 1973 cost report, the agency agreed to disclose the data.1 The
plaintiff nursing home owner then brought an action in federal court to
enjoin release of the cost report, claiming that the report was within one
of the FOIA exemptions and that its disclosure would harm the nursing
home's competitive position. 2
8. E.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 .(D.C. Cir. 1975);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir.
1974); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Civil No. 75-104 (D.
Del. Oct. 23, 1975); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 37 AD. L.2D 447
(D.D.C. 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va.
1974); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Neal-Cooper Grain
Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger,
384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 34 An.
L2D 790 (E.D. Va. 1974).
A party may be able to prevent disclosure of information he has submitted to the
government under the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, although
the Act applies only to "individuals." See Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An -Over-
view, 1976 DuKFE L.J 301, 302-06.
9. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a)(3), (b) (Supp. 1976).
10. McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
11. Id. at 505-06.
12. Id. at 506. The district court held that the Secretary would be acting beyond
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One can imagine that the extra-judicial recourses of the owner were
far from satisfactory: he could have refused to submit future cost
reports, thereby losing the benefits of the Medicare program 13 and
almost certainly becoming unable to compete with Medicare-assisted
homes; or he could have continued in the program and given up the
confidential cost data to competitors who may have had the capacity to
use that information to underprice him, forcing him from the market.1 4
This Note will examine the basis upon which a reverse-FOIA
plaintiff may seek relief. The few cases which address the issue illus-
trate that the courts consistently have been required to address two
recurrent issues in their analysis of the reverse-FOIA suit: (1) whether
the FOIA exemptions may be construed to forbid or restrict disclosure
of information, and (2) if the exemptions do not restrict disclosure,
whether some other substantive and jurisdictional bases exist to prevent
disclosure. As will be seen, however, the remedy itself may be inade-
quate to protect fully the confidentiality of information submitted to the
government even if either or both of these underlying questions are
resolved in favor of the reverse-FOIA plaintiff.
BASIS OF THE REVERSE-FOIA ACTION
The Exemptionrs-Permissive or Compulsory?
To begin with a point on which the courts are in agreement,1 5 it is
clear that in order to qualify for relief the reverse-FOIA plaintiff must
the scope of his own regulations and in violation of the confidentiality exemption, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970), and granted the injunction. 386 F. Supp. at 508.
13. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.406(b) (1975) (requirement that providers of Medicare
services submit annual cost reports); id. § 405.406(e) (suspension of program payments
to provider when it does not maintain adequate records for determination of reasonable
cost).
14. Thus far it does not appear that a reverse-FOIA action has been brought by a
party other than one who has himself submitted the information sought to be protected.
However, a person may have legitimate interests in the confidentiality of some document
which contains information about him though he himself did not surrender the document
to the government. Indeed the case of one harmed by information he had no part in
collecting or submitting is especially appealing, since there is no conceivable way he
could have protected his own interests. While the following discussion assumes that the
reverse-FOIA plaintiff has himself submitted the information he seeks to protect, the ju-
dicial remedy should be equally available to one who has not supplied the documents;
the interests to be protected are those of privacy and not property.
15. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940-41 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (if information not found within confidentiality exemption on remand, it must
be disclosed); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 509 F.2d 527,
529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (denial of preliminary injunction because plaintiff unlikely to
be able to show information was exempt); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n, Civil No. 75-104, at 39-41 (D. Del. Oct. 23, 1975) (determination that
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show that the information he seeks to protect is exempt under the Act."6
This showing is fundamental simply because the Act mandates disclo-
sure of all non-exempt documents17 and hence release of such docu-
ments certainly may not be enjoined."" Beyond this point there is
considerable disagreement among the courts over how to proceed.19
Once a court has determined that information sought to be protect-
ed is in fact within an exemption, the first question it must address is
whether the exemptions are permissive or compulsory; it must decide
whether the agency has discretion to release the information or whether
the agency is flatly prohibited from releasing it. The most comprehen-
sive argument in support of the latter contention is found in Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger.20  There, in rejecting the agency-
information is exempt under statutory exemption precedes discussion of whether disclo-
sure should be enjoined); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246,
1249-50 (E.D. Va. 1974) (disclosure of information prolbited on finding of confiden-
tiality as defined in FOIA exemption); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507
(W.D. Ky. 1974) (court first finds that information is within confidentiality exemp-
tion); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 775 (D.D.C. 1974)
(FOIA would permit disclosure unless exemption to disclosure applicable); Hughes Air-
craft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 295 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (key factor is whether
information is confidential and therefore exempt); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesin-
ger, 35 A. L.2D 790, 791-92 (E.D. Va. 1974) (information judged confidential under
FOIA exemption and disclosure barred).
16. In the regular FOIA action the agency has the burden of proving that there is
a basis for declaring information exempt. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1976).
See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd
on this point, 505 F.2d 350, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It seems reasonable to expect the
plaintiff to assume this burden in a reverse-FOIA action, since such a showing is a pre-
requisite to preventing an agency from disclosing the information. See note 15 supra
and text accompanying note 9 supra. Moreover, congressional intent to establish a "gen-
eral philosophy of full agency disclosure" suggests that documents in agency custody
should be presumed subject to disclosure until proven otherwise, exemption being the
exception rather than the rule. See note 2 supra.
17. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. 1976). But see Note, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DuKn L.J. 416, 424-27 (discussion of whether
federal courts have discretion to refuse to order disclosure of non-exempt information).
18. In Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), it
was determined that the scope of the court's inquiry on the issue of whether the informa-
tion is within an exemption should be that of de novo review. Id. at 940-41 n.4. A
de novo evidentiary hearing is inappropriate in a review of informal agency action,
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973); see note 73 infra; however, the Charles
River court reasoned that "in holding this hearing the district court is not reviewing
agency action, it is making a threshold determination whether the plaintiff has any cause
of action at all." 519 F.2d at 940-41 n.4. Thus the court's consideration of whether
material is exempt should be the same whether the issue is raised in an action for dis-
closure under subsection (a) (3) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. 1976),
or in a reverse-FOIA suit. 519 F.2d at 940-41 n.4.
19. See notes 20-29, 84-89 infra and accompanying text.
20. 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974). Westinghouse Electric and a subsidiary
(Vol. 1976:330
REVERSE-FOIA SUITS
defendant's argument that FOIA exemptions leave the release of exempt
documents to agency discretion,21 the court first quoted excerpts of the
Senate and House committee reports which emphasize that the func-
tions to be served by the FOIA exemptions include protection of the
confidentiality of information submitted by private parties and protec-
tion of the privacy of the parties themselves. 2 2 As additional support for
its position, the court quoted from Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,n interest-
ingly a case in which the plaintiffs sought ,to compel, not enjoin, disclo-
sure: "This provision [the confidentiality exemption] serves the impor-
tant function of protecting the privacy and the competitive position of
the citizen who offers information to assist government policy mak-
ers."24 The Westinghouse court brought this dictum into the reverse-
FOIA context to support a conclusion that the exemption's purpose of
protecting privacy and confidentiality allows "a plaintiff which the ex-
emption is designed to protect' to invoke the exemption "where dis-
closure is threatenedL" 25
brought this action to enjoin government agencies from releasing an employer informa-
tion report and an affirmative action plan they had submitted. The subsidiary, Fraser
& Johnston, had filed the reports with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance as
required of government contractors. Id. at 1075. The employer information reports
consist of statistics on the ethnic composition of a government contractor's work force.
Affirmative action plans outline a proposed course of action by which the contractor
intends to correct effects of past employment discrimination. These reports are required
under penalty of contract cancellation.
The district court confirmed the decision and rationale of Westinghouse in United
States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 35 AD. L.2d 790 (E.D. Va. 1974), a reverse-FOIA
case which the presiding judge decided independently of any consideration of Westing-
house, although he wrote the opinion after reviewing the former case. Id. at 791.
21. The court flatly rejected the argument that FOIA exemptions are permissive
only, and that the FOIA is authority only for disclosing information and cannot be used
to bar disclosure. 392 F. Supp. at 1250. Such a contention, the court said, makes "the
statutory exemption meaningless and flies in the face of the protective purpose of the
exemption[s] . . . "' Id.
22. Id. The court set forth the following portions of the legislative history:
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information whieh
is obtained by the Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but
which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from
whom it was obtained. This would include business sales statistics, inventories,
customer lists, and manufacturing processes. S. RP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1965).
It would also include information which is given to an agency in confidence,
since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where
the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents
or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.
RR. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
23. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 938, quoted in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp.
1246, 1250 (RD. Va. 1974).
25. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va.
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The leading case on the other side of the question is Charles River
Park "A", Inc. v. HUD.2" The Charles River court concluded that the
FOLA makes no statement at all with respect to exempt information, a
conclusion which necessarily follows from a single proposition adopted
by the court: "If. . .this information falls within the fourth exemption,
then the FOLA does not apply to it because the language of the FOTA
clearly provides that the Act 'does not apply to matters' that fall within
1974); see United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 35 A. L.2D 790, 791 (E.D. Va.
1974) (rejecting as "without merit" the argument that "only the Government may use
the exemptions to justify nondisclosure").
The reasoning of two other federal district courts is largely in accord with that of
the Westinghouse court. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D.
Cal. 1974), the court also premised its substantive analysis on the assumption that FOIA
exemptions in themselves can prevent disclosure. The case was brought by Hughes Air-
craft, a government contractor, in an effort to enjoin release of the affirmative action
plan it had submitted to the government. Id. at 294. The court considered the exemp-
tions as "restricting" disclosure of documents and agreed with the plaintiff that nondis-
closure might be required by a reading of the trade secrets exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(4) (1970), and a regulation which requires that affirmative action plans be released
unless they qualify as exempt. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2, -40.3 (1974). The court, how-
ever, found against the plaintiff on the facts. 384 F. Supp. at 296.
Likewise, the court in McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974),
stated definitively that all government agencies are "forbidden to release" information
Which falls within the confidentiality exemption. Id. at 507. In the alternative, the
court suggested another approach: an agency may not be permitted to release informa-
tion if in so doing it exceeds the scope of agency regulations which authorized such dis-
closure. Id. The governing regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 401.1 et seq. (1975), as amended,
40 Fed. Reg. 27,649-50 (1975), and more particularly, 20 C.F.R. § 401.3(u) (1975),
were published pursuant to a specific disclosure statute which provides: "No disclosure
. .. of any file, record, report or other paper, or any information, obtained at any time
...by any officer or employee of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
. ..in the course of discharging their respective duties . . . shall be made except as
the Secretary... may by regulations prescribe." 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970). The regu-
lation, 20 C.F.R. § 401.3 (u) (4) (1975), in turn states that information concerning costs
of operation and other information from financial reports furnished by Medicare facili-
ties such as the plaintiff's business (providers of services under Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act) may be disclosed only to certain federal or state officers or employees.
Since the plaintiffs cost report was to be released to a party other than a federal or
state official, such agency action was, in the McCoy court's opinion, unauthorized. 386
F. Supp. at 507. For the factual background of the case, see notes 10-13 supra. The
argument that disclosure should be enjoined when it is contrary to a federal regulation
was also made in Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 772, 774, 777
(D.D.C. 1974).
26. 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs in the case, operators of a multi-
family housing project had sought injunctive relief in the district court against HUD
to halt impending release of detailed financial reports they had submitted under the Fed-
eral Housing Administration program. The court of appeals agreed with the lower
court's conclusion that, once it was determined that the reports fell within the confiden-
tiality exemption of the FOIA, the Act "simply does not apply to this case" because it
"neither prohibits nor authorizes disclosure" of exempt data. 360 F. Supp. 212, 213
(D.D.C. 1973).
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an exemption."2 7  If this assertion is accepted, the FOIA cannot be
interpreted as forbidding agencies from releasing exempt information.
By definition, no act makes provision for matters to which it "does not
apply. 29
An examination of the specific language of the statute and its
legislative history leads to the conclusion that the Charles River court
27. 519 F.2d at 942.
28. Professor Davis apparently decided quite early that the FOIA does not require
an agency to withhold exempt records, Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary
Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. RPv. 761, 766 (1967), and he continues to espouse that inter-
pretation: "[The FOLA's] exemptions protect against required disclosure, not against
disclosure." K. DAvis, Tnxr § 3A.5.
29. Two other District of Columbia District Court cases, decided after the lower
court decision in Charles River, have dealt with the reverse-FOIA question. While the
outline of the issues in both cases roughly parallels that of Charles River, each suggests
some variations in the analysis of reverse-FOIA suits.
In the first of these cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration,
384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974), the plaintiff sought to prevent disclosure of affirma-
tive action plans and employer information reports which it had been required to furnish
to two government agencies by virtue of its status as a government contractor. Id. at'999-
1000. The court denied relief, holding that the information did not qualify as exempt
and was therefore required to be disclosed. 384 F. Supp. at 1004-05. The court did
not decide whether Sears was entitled to have selected portions of purportedly confiden-
tial data deleted from the documents before they would be released. Since the General
Service Administration/Office of Federal Contract Compliance had offered throughout
the litigation to consider any specific objections to release of selected portions in the
light of its agency regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.3 (1975), the court found that Sears
had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies on that score. Id. at 1006-08.
The other case to come before the District of Columbia court was Neal-Cooper
Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974). The plaintiffs in this action
alleged that information they had submitted to the Customs Service was confidential and
therefore could not be released by the Service to officials of the Mexican government.
Criticizing the district court decision in Charles River as "apparently concluding that
[the FOIA] had no relevance to a claim seeking to bar disclosure," id. at 775, the court
applied the FOIA by questioning "whether disclosure is inappropriate under the Act or
its implementing regulations." Id. at 776. The Neal-Cooper court's application of the
test, however, was similar to that of Charles River: the court addressed first whether
the information could qualify as exempt, id. at 776, and second whether disclosure
"would harm innocent parties." Id. at 777. It determined that the information was
non-exempt and therefore that disclosure was appropriate. Id. at 776-77.
As in Charles River, the court assumed that the FOTA "would permit the disclosure
of this information unless an exemption to disclosure is applicable." Id. at 775.
Further, the court expressly approved the Customs Regulations' interpretation of the
FOIA exemptions,as permitting an agency to release exempt documents. Id. at 777
n.37, citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 384 F. Supp. 996
(D.D.C. 1974) (as representing the "general view" that the exemptions authorize non-
disclosure but do not require it). The Customs Regulations allow the Service the discre-
tion to disclose information which may lawfully be withheld if such disclosure is in the
public interest. 19 C.F.R. § 103.0 (1974). The Neal-Cooper court found that the Serv-
ice had discretion to release its own investigatory files where there was no showing that
such release would harm innocent parties, 385 F. Supp. at 769-77.
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was correct in its conclusion that the exemptions are permissive only.
Subsection (a) of section 552 commences with the phrase: "Each
agency shall make available to the public information as follows
* * *0" After the disclosure requirements of section 552(a) are
enumerated, subsection (b) provides: "This section does not apply to
matters that are [within the definition of exemptions (1)-(9)]." 31
The clear import of the language of section 552(b) is that Congress has
determined not to legislate with respect to certain categories of docu-
ments which have been legislatively designated "exempt." It would be
an error of logic to read subsection (b) as stating the negative of section
552(a) so as to imply a prohibition. Regardless of what Congress
meant, that simply is not what is said.
The legislative history is not contrary to this interpretation, al-
though both the original Senate and House committee reports stress the
importance of the exemptions as a means of protecting "important rights
of privacy. '3 2  While these reports may provide some guidance in
construing the Act, the mere observation that Congress was concerned
with protecting privacy interests when it enacted the FOIA clearly does
not answer the more important question of how Congress in fact provid-
ed for the protection of those interests.
Moreover, the provisions which Congress did enact suggest that
reliance on these committee reports as authority for the proposition that
the exemptions are mandatory is incorrect. The FOIA specifically
grants a judicial remedy for private parties seeking to compel disclo-
sure.83 There is no parallel provision giving any similar remedy to
those seeking to prevent disclosure. The statute goes only so far as to
say that the disclosure requirements "[do] not apply" to information 'to
which an interest in privacy, as defined by the Act, might attach. One
can only conclude that the "protection" which the FOIA was meant to
provide to private parties with an interest in nondisclosure is to allow
agencies the discretion to take the private parties' interests into consider-
ation in deciding whether or not to release exempt information. 4
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
31. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Supp. 1976), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
32. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). See also id. at 9; H.R. REP.
No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
33. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4) (B) (Supp. 1976).
34. The House committee report on the 1974 FOIA amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-
502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), recognizes that the original intent of the statute is merely
to allow agencies the opportunity to withhold exempt information: "[Anyone may ob-
tain information in the possession of agencies] subject to nine categories of exemptions,
whose invocation in most cases is optional ... ." H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1974) (emphasis added); cf. Reliability of Elec. & Gas Service, 34 AD. L.D
[Vol. 1976:330
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A final rebuttal to the contention that the exemptions section might
compel nondisclosure is found in the last subsection of the Act: "This
section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this
section." 5 The provision is a final affirmation that "disclosure is thus
the guiding star. . . in construing the Act." 6 As the court of appeals
concluded in Charles River, the FOIA simply makes no statement or
directive with respect to whether exempt information should or must be
withheld by the agency 7 -the exemptions permit nondisclosure but
they do not compel it.
Since the Act does not prescribe how an agency may handle
exempt information, agencies must look to other sources for authority to
disclose it. Such authorization is supplied by section 301 of title 5,
which provides that heads of executive departments may issue regula-
tions for the custody and use of agency records."' Hence in the absence
of some other statute limiting its discretionary authority,3 9 an agency
is vested with responsibility for determining whether to release or with-
hold FOIA-exempt documents.4"
Substantive Basis of the Reverse-FOJA Action
It might at first appear that the conclusion that the FOIA does not
restrict an agency's disclosure of exempt information puts an end to the
inquiry into the substantive basis of a reverse-FOIA suit. But as
Charles River itself suggests,4 ' there is another possible judicial path
1054, 1056 (FPC Opinion No. 687, Feb. 4, 1974) (controversy challenging right of FPC
to release valuable proprietary information: "[The FOIA] exemptions are a privilege
of the agency not of one seeking to protect the confidentiality of the information.").
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
36. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F.
Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
37. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970); see Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d
935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Other statutes also provide independent grants of authority
to disclose. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970) (FTC).
39. E.g., INT. Rnv. CODE oF 1954 § 6103(a) (strictly limiting public access to
income tax returns). See note 47 infra.
40. This does not mean that an agency's decision to release or withhold exempt in-
formation may not be reviewed by the federal courts. See notes 62-83 infra and accom-
panying text.
41. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The substantive issues which the court directed to -be considered on remand in determin-
ing whether to grant relief were:
(1) Whether the information in question was FOIA-exempt.
(2) If so, whether it would be an abuse of discretion for the agency to re-
lease the information; that is,
(a) whether the information would fall under the prohibitions of section
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open to the person who wishes to prevent an agency from making public
the information which he has submitted. Even if the exemptions are
permissive, the agency's decision to disclose exempt information is still
subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Thus, assuming a jurisdictional basis can be found for the action (a point
to be considered),42 such disclosure may be halted by proof that it
would constitute agency action which is "an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."4 The cases suggest three spe-
cific approaches the reverse-FOIA plaintiff might use once he has
shown that the information in question is FOIA-exempt: he can allege
(1) that disclosure of the information in question would violate a stat-
ute; (2) that disclosure would be contrary to agency regulations; or (3)
that disclosure would constitute an abuse of agency discretion.
(1) Disclosure would violate a statute. This first approach is the
most straightforward. The plaintiff in this situation need show only
that disclosure would violate a particular federal statute in order to
prove both that the information is FOIA-exempt and also that disclosure
must be enjoined. Once it is determined that a specific statute prohibits
the disclosure of certain information, the information is by definition
exempt from mandatory disclosure under the statutory exemption of the
FOIA.44  At the same time, disclosure which would violate a statute
may be enjoined under the APA as agency action which is "not in
accordance with law." 4" Thus, this form of reverse-FOIA suit appears
identical to a suit brought pursuant to the nondisclosure statute itself,
and simply alleges that disclosure would violate that law.46
1905 of the criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, or
(b) whether balancing "the interests of the [requesting party] and the pub-
lic.., against the interests of [Charles River Park] in keeping the
information confidential," the agency would abuse its discretion if it
released the information. Id.
42. See notes 84-120 infra and accompanying text.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
44. The statutory exemption would apply since the information would be "specific-
ally exempted from disclosure by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1970).
45. Id. § 706(2) (A); see GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n,
Civil No. 75-104 at 39, 41, 55 (D. Del. Oct. 23, 1975) (disclosure enjoined because
Consumer Product Safety Commission did not comply with Food, Drug, and Consumer
Product Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (Supp. I1, 1973), in releasing report on televi-
sion-related accidents).
46, It should be noted, however, that an action brought under the APA to prevent
disclosure is analytically different from one brought under the nondisclosure statute it-
self. In the latter, assuming disclosure would violate the statute, the question is whether
a right of action to enjoin disclosure will be implied. A suit under the APA, on the
other -hand, simply addresses the question whether disclosure would violate the statute,
and thus constitute agency action "not in accordance with law." In order to sustain a
suit under the APA, however, an independent source of jurisdiction must be found (as-
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In order to successfully invoke a statutory proscription, without
more, to prevent disclosure, a plaintiff must show that the statute
mandates nondisclosure in absolute terms." An obvious example of
such a statute is the tax code provision4" which restricts disclosure of
income tax returns except upon order of the President or under disclo-
sure regulations approved by him." If a statute merely gives an agency
the discretion to release or withhold information, of course, the plaintiff
cannot prove that the disclosure of the documents in question is unlaw-
ful merely by showing they are within the ambit of that statute.50 The
plaintiff must therefore ask the court to adjudicate whether agency
discretion has been abused. This inquiry is similar to that involved in a
reverse-FOIA action based solely on review of agency discretion,"
except that the policies underlying the discretionary statute should be
considered. Typical of statutes in this category is section 1104 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,52 which grants the Federal Aviation
Board discretion to withhold public disclosure of information on receipt
sumning the APA does not itself provide jurisdiction), while a decision to imply a right
of action under the nondisclosure statute is itself a decision on the jurisdictional ques-
tion.
47. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (2) (Supp. m, 1973) (prohibiting public disclosure
by Consumer Product Safety Commission of "trade secretis] or other matter referred
to in section 1905 of Title 18"); 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970) ("[No disclosure . . .of
any file, record, report or other paper, or any information, obtained at any time ...
by any officer or employee of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare . . .
in the course of discharging their respective duties... shall be made except as the Sec-
retary. . . may by regulations prescribe."). The latter must, of course, tbe interpreted
with reference to implementing regulations. See notes 63-66 infra and accompanying
text.
48. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 6103.
49. "[Income tax] returns made with respect to taxes imposed by chapters 1, 2,
3, and 6 ...shall be open to [public] inspection only upon order of the President and
under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and approved by
the President." Id.
50. A statute which grants an agency the discretion to withhold information creates
a category of exempt information through the statutory exemption. See Administrator,
FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 262.(1975). The nature of a reverse-FOIA suit im-
plies, however, that when the action is brought the agency has decided to exercise any
statutory discretion it may have by releasing the data. In this situation, the agency itself
does not trigger the statutory exemption, unlike the situation in Robertson, where a deci-
sion to withhold information was made pursuant to a discretionary statute. In a reverse-
FOIA suit, the plaintiff does not necessarily lose the benefit of the statutory exemption
although the agency's discretionary decision is adverse to his interests. The plaintiff
asks the court to review the agency's action, see notes 51-53 infra and accompanying
text, and if the court holds in favor of the plaintiff, thereby substituting its judgment
for that of the agency, the statutory exemption is'automatically satisfied -by the court's
determination that withholding information is proper in light of the discretionary statute.
51. See notes 72-83 infra.
52. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970).
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of a written objection to its release. The statute itself suggests criteria to
guide agency judgment-the requirements of the public interest and the
potential adverse effect on the party objecting to release 5 -- and these
factors should be of special importance in a court's evaluation of the
agency's exercise of discretion.
A frequently invoked statute in reverse-FOIA cases, undoubtedly
because of its broad applicability, is section 1905 of the criminal code.54
Although t.e statute does not actually forbid the disclosure of informa-
tion, but instead imposes criminal sanctions on any agency employee
who releases "trade secrets . . . [or] confidential statistical data . . .
of any person,""5 the substantive .theory of a case brought under this
provision is similar to that of any other reverse-FOIA suit grounded in a
statute which precludes disclosure in absolute terms. Since section
1905 does not speak in terms of discretion,58 disclosure of information
in violation of its terms would clearly constitute agency action "not in
accordance with law" and thus could be prevented under the APA. This
was the theory apparently adopted by the court in Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. HUD,57 when, in discussing section 1905, it stated that "if
the disclosure of the information involved here would constitute a
violation of a criminal statute, it would be an abuse of discretion for an
agency to ignore such a statutory mandate and release the informa-
tion."5 8
One important difference between this provision and statutes which
actually prohibit the disclosure of information is that section 1905 may
not be treated as a statute which qualifies under the statutory exemption
of the FOIA.59 Thus, unless the information in question falls within
53. "Whenever [a written objection to public disclosure of FAA information] is
made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public dis-
closure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect
the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public." Id.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
55. Id.
56. Id. Indeed, the criminal sanctions apparently preclude discretion with respect
to the information covered by the statute.
57. 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Although the court speaks in terms of
an "abuse of discretion," it is probably more accurate in terms of the APA to character-
ize the agency's release of material falling within section 1905 as agency action "not
in accordance with law." Section 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970),
provides for judicial curtailment of agency action which is either "an abuse of discretion"
or "not in accordance with law."
58. 519 F.2d at 942.
59. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031, 1033 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); Grumman
Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 579, 580 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd
(Vol. 1976:330
REVERSE-FOIA SUITS
another exemption, the Act may require that it be disclosed even if such
disclosure would violate this section. However, since section 1905
applies to material which is confidential in nature, the reverse-FOIA
plaintiff may be able to prove in many cases that the confidentiality
exemption 0 applies to the information he seeks to protect.61
(2) Disclosure would contravene an" agency regulation. The sec-
ond tack a plaintiff may take is to argue that the disclosure he seeks to
avoid would constitute a violation of an agency regulation and hence
should be enjoined. Agency regulations providing for policies and
procedures to govern the release of agency documents are authorized
either by section 301 of title 562 or by some other statute which directs
federal agencies to publish guidelines for disclosure of information.63
The Supreme Court has held that agency officials are bound by regula-
tions the agency has promulgated in all matters which involve "more
than mere consideration of procedural irregularities." 64 In other words,
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168 (1975); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F.
Supp. 769, 774-75 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administra-
tion, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1323-
24 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073
(D.C. Cir. 1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469-70 (D.D.C.
1972); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675, 678-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
60. 5 U.S.C. I 552(b) (4) (1970). See note 5 supra.
61. The meaning of "confidential" as used in section 1905 apparently has not been
defined in the case law. As a criminal statute, it is to be narrowly construed, Charles
River Park "A", ,Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975), but so too are the
FOIA exemptions. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
There is no reason to suppose, however, that the criteria for showing "confidentiality"
under section 1905 should be broader than the tests which the courts have constructed
to guide their application of the confidentiality exemption of the FOIA. See National
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (confiden-
tiality exemption implies that disclosure would either (1) impair government's ability
to obtain information in future, or (2) cause harm to competitive position of person
from whom information was obtained). Thus, information which falls within section
1905 should also fall within the confidentiality exemption.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
63. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970).
64. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 541 (1959); see Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363, 372, 388-89 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954). In
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974), the court re-
sponded to allegations that disclosure should be halted because the Customs Service
had not complied with its own regulations requiring that foreign government requests
for information be forwarded to Washington for a decision on disclosure (19 C.F.RL §
103.2(g) (1970)):
fThe plaintiffs] assert that these regulations have the force of law and govern
the activities of the Service. While this is doubtless true in regard to those
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regulations have the force of law with respect to governance of the
agency itself.65 It follows, then, that if a reverse-FOIA plaintiff can
show that release of the information he seeks to protect would violate an
agency regulation, such release should be prevented under the APA.60
Two cases recognize this form of the reverse-FOIA action. In
McCoy v. Weinberger67 the court found that "a further reason exists for
applying the APA [governing judicial review of agency discretion] to
defendants' action which is that an agency of the Government may not
act beyond the confines of its own regulations. ' 68  Similarly, release of
certain portions of an affirmative action plan was enjoined in Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger"9 on the basis of an agency regulation which
prohibited disclosure of certain parts of such plans when their release
would "injure the business or financial position of the contractor, [or]
would constitute a release of confidential financial information of an
employee.170  Thus, in the context of a reverse-FOIA suit, agency
action is subject to attack not only by allegation that it does not conform
to federal law, but also by allegation that the agency has not abided by
its own published procedures and policies.
(3) Disclosure would constitute an abuse of agency discretion.
Even if disclosure of the information in question is not prohibited by
statute or agency regulation, leaving the decision to release the informa-
tion completely within the discretion of the agency, the reverse-FOIA
plaintiff may still be able to prevent disclosure by adopting a third
approach. The APA7' provides for judicial curtailment of agency
action which is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."72
regulations which govern the activities of the Service in relation to outside
parties, the Court has difficulty in concluding that a regulation governing pure-
ly internal activities and processes cannot be waived. 385 F. Supp. at 777.
65. For a discussion of the situations in which an agency may violate its own regula-
tions, see Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L REv.
629 (1974).
66. See McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507-0 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 298 (C.D. Cal. 1974); cf. Neal-Cooper
Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 777 (D.D.C. 1974).
67. 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
68. Id. at 507. The regulations found controlling in McCoy had been promulgated
pursuant to section 1306 of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970). See note
47 supra.
69. 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
70. 41 C.F.1. § 60-40.3 (a) (2) (1974), quoted in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesin-
ger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970).
72. Id. § 706(2) (A). When judicial review is sought on this basis, an argument
might be made that review is not authorized under the APA because the situation falls
under the exception which applies when "agency action is committed to agency discre-
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Thus, an agency may be enjoined from disclosing particular material if,
on a consideration of all circumstances, such disclosure would constitute
an abuse of the agency's discretion within the meaning of the APA. 73
tion by law." Id. § 701(a) (2). The Charles River court found that authorization for
any release of agency records and information is provided by section 301 of the APA,
5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), and that "agency action taken under section 301 is subject to
review under -he Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to determine whether [the agen-
cy's] disclosure of the requested information would be an abuse of its discretion."
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This con-
clusion seems warranted by the interpretations which have been given to the scope of
section 701(a) (2). See, e.g., Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 384 F.
Supp. 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The Sears court espoused the narrow interpretation of this exemption from APA-
authorized review which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), that the federal courts are denied
jurisdiction by this exemption only when there is "no law" which the court can apply
in reviewing agency action. 384 F. Supp. at 1001. The district court implied that the
"law to be applied in the case before it wab the FOIA." Id.
Thus, if agency disclosure is under section 301 of title 5, 5 U.S.C. 5 301 (1970),
or pursuant to some regulation which embodies an element of discretion, the agency ac-
tion should still be reviewable in federal district court. See Berger, Administrative Arbi.
trariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. Ruv. 55 (1965), cited in Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), for the proposition that section
701(a) (2) is a "very narrow" exception. Professor Berger argues that, "Congress re-
garded an 'abuse of discretion' as 'not in accordance with law,' and in consequence did
not embody it within the exception for 'action... by law committed to agency discre-
tion." Berger, supra, at 61.
73. Section 706(2) (A) does not authorize de novo review and, although the court's
"inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review
is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417 (1971); accord,
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974);
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 14142 (1973); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD,
519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
In applying the standard, the court may seek additional evidence from the agency:
"If ... there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective
judicial review, the remedy [is] ...to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits
or testimony, such additional explanations of the reasons for the agency decision as may
prove necessary." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); see Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Thus, though the administra-
tive record already in existence should be the "focal point for judicial review," 411 U.S.
at 142, the court may go beyond that record when such a step is necessary to "have
sufficient information to consider rationally the [agencys] actions." GTE Sylvania,
Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, Civil No. 75-104 at 33-34 (D. Del. Oct. 23,
1975); see Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519
F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. AEC, 364 F. Supp. 423, 425
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
The court of appeals in Charles River, however, directed the lower court on remand
to hold an evidentiary hearing on the threshold issue of whether the information is ex-
empt under the FOIA. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See note 18 supra.
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This third approach was adopted by the court in Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. HUD,74 which outlined the considerations to be weighed in
making the determination whether the agency has abused its discretion:
(1) whether the information was submitted in confidence, (2) the
interests of the party requesting the information, and (3) the interests of
the public in disclosure. 75
The first consideration noted by the court suggests that the reason-
able expectation of a party that information he submits to an agency will
remain confidential is an important factor in deciding whether relief
is justified. 76  The weight given this factor, in turn, will depend partly
upon the legitimacy of the confidentiality interests asserted. In Neal-
Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 7 for example, while questioning whether
disclosure "would harm innocent parties, '7 8 the district court refused to
enjoin the release of the materials in question since the plaintiff had
made no showing of confidentiality "beyond certain bare assertions
found in the complaint."7 9 As a practical matter, private parties may
anticipate this consideration by seeking an agency's promise 'to protect
data or at least by articulating a request for confidentiality. 0
However, when even a legitimate expectation of confidentiality is
balanced against the third consideration suggested by the court, that of
74. 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger,
385 F. Supp. 769, 777, 779 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services
Administration, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1007 (D.D.C. 1974).
75. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
It should be noted that consideration of such circumstances calls for a determination
much different from that involved in the initial decision of whether information is ex-
empt. Far from providing for a balancing of equities in making the latter determination,
the FOIA was specifically designed to preclude consideration of the identity and interests
of the particular party who requests disclosure. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
5-6 (1966); see Robles v. EPA, 484. F.2d 843, 848. (4th Cir. 1973); Frankel v. SEC,
460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (personnel and medical records exemption, section 552(b)(6), is ex-
ception to general thrust of Act, since by its terms it demands discretionary balancing
of competing interests).
Thus, non-exempt documents are required to be released pursuant to the FOIA even
though the agency has given a promise of confidentiality. Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d
887, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973); Get-
man v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321,
1324 n.4 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d
1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes 76-80 infra and accompanying text.
76. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
77. 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974).
78. Id. at 777.
79. Id. The court found that the plaintiff had not even shown the information to
be within the confidentiality exemption.
80. But such agreements cannot shield information from the operation of the FOIA.
See note 75 supra.
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the "public interest" in disclosure, the courts may tend to weigh the lat-
ter more heavily. The court of appeals in Charles River stated: "If the
public interest consideration supports disclosure of this information, the
fact that it was submitted in confidence would not be enough to estab-
lish that the release of the information is an abuse of discretion."81
Finally, the court's acknowledgement of the interests of the party
seeking disclosure suggests that it may be appropriate in some instances
to permit only limited disclosure. For example, while release of the
Charles River Park financial statements to Boston's Commissioner of
Assessing may be justifiable, 2 release of the same information to a
competitor may not be appropriate.8 3  Further, even if the interests of
the party requesting disclosure are persuasive, the court may consider
permitting the release subject to an order that the recipient keep the
documents in strict confidence.
Jurisdictional Basis of the Reverse-FOIA Action
The second major analytical obstacle with which courts have grap-
pled in reverse-FOIA cases is that of jurisdiction. While no court has
failed to find jurisdiction, 4 there has been substantial disagreement as to
the proper basis for this finding. Three alternatives which the courts
have discussed are (1) jurisdiction by virtue of the APA, 5 (2) an
81. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
In Charles River the plaintiff alleged an interest in keeping the information confidential
and a reliance upon agency promises of confidentiality. See id. at 939. The tax asses-
sor who sought the reports alleged that he needed them for making accurate tax assess-
ments, id., and the court considered his demand as that of "a government body which
intends to use the information in performance of the legitimate and traditional govern-
mental function" of taxation. 1d. at 943.
82. Id. at 939-40 (remanding for evidentiary hearing).
83. See McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (plaintiff
successfully protected financial reports by showing that disclosure to competitor "would
cause substantial harm to its competitive position'); cf. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesin-
ger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (suggesting that relief is appropriate if
plaintiff can show that substantial harm to his competitive position would result from
release).
84. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C Cir 1975);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Westinghouse Elee. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va.
1974); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Neal-Cooper
Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974) (jurisdiction assumed without
discussion); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal.
1974); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 35 AD. L.2z 790 (E.D. Va. 1974) (juris-
diction assumed without discussion).
85. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507 (WD. Ky. 1974); Seare, Roebuck & Co.
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implied private right of action under a nondisclosure statute, 6 and (3)
general federal question jurisdiction. 7 As will be seen, the first two
alternatives have significant weaknesses.8 8 The third possibility, on the
other hand, is analytically sound and should serve as a basis for every
reverse-FOIA suit whether grounded in violation of statute or agency
regulation or in abuse-of agency discretion. 89 An additional problem in
the area of jurisdiction is whether sovereign immunity bars a reverse-
FOIA suit. Although the courts have yet to discuss fully sovereign
immunity in the context of a reverse-FOIA action, ° the defense poses
substantial theoretical difficulties for maintaining such an action.
(1) Jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. The
Charles River court9 and several earlier district court reverse-FOIA
decisions 2 found jurisdiction under the APA."3 Under this theory, the
reverse-FOIA plaintiff is entitled to bring suit by virtue of his contention
that he is a person "adversely affected or aggrieved"9 4 by the agency's
decision to release the information involved. Disclosure, it is urged,
would cause some harm to his interests.
v. General Services Administration, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (D.D.C.), affd, 509 F.2d
527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (no review under section 1905); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F.
Supp, 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974) (federal question jurisdiction under section 1905).
87. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va.
1974) (federal question jurisdiction arising under FOIA); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (federal question jurisdiction aris-
ing under FOIA).
88. See notes 91-108 infra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 109-20 infra and accompanying text.
90. Several courts have acknowledged the existence of a possible sovereign immunity
defense, but none has given the issue more than a conclusory treatment. See Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974); McCoy v.
Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General
Services Administration, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D.D.C. 1974); Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The Westinghouse court's ap-
proach is typical:
[Trhe relief sought, if granted, would not "expend itself on the public treasury
or domain, or interfere with the public administration" to the extent that the
Government would be "stopped in its tracks." Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 931,
938 (1947); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign [Commerce] Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
704 (1949); and.., the actions of the federal officers are sufficiently alleged
to be beyond their statutory powers so that those actions would not be the ac-
tions of the sovereign. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621 (1963). Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974).
91. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. E.g., McCoy v. .Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 507 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (D.D.C.
1974).
93. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970).
94. Id. § 702.
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It appears, however, that several circuits have refused to recognize
the APA as an independent grant of jurisdiction in any context. 95
Instead, these courts have found the APA's purpose to be limited to
"[defining] the procedures and manner of judicial review of agency
action rather than [conferring] jurisdiction."9  The decisions of the
courts on this point are "irreconcilably conflicting '"' and the Supreme
Court has not spoken directly to the issue.98  Thus, it cannot presently
be said that all federal circuits will find jurisdiction over a reverse-FOIA
suit on the basis of the APA alone.
(2) Private right of action under a nondisclosure statute. As
previously discussed, 99 a statute which prohibits the disclosure of partic-
ular information may provide a substantive basis for preventing an
agency from releasing exempt information. Such a statute may also
provide a jurisdictional basis for the reverse-FOIA suit by virtue of an
implied right of action under the statute itself to prevent a violation of its
terms. When the interests which a particular statute is designed to pro-
tect are asserted by a party although the statute itself does not ex-
95. Second Circuit: Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960). But see Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d
1, 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1966) (implying that section 10 of the APA includes grant of jurisdic-
tion). Second Circuit panels have explicitly recognized the conflict among jurisdictions
on this issue. Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 679 n.1
(2d Cir. 1966).
Third Circuit: West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 37 A. L.2D 183, 191 (3d Cir.
1975); Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326, 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
911 (1970); Operating Eng'rs Local 542 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964); Schwab v. Quesada, 284 F.2d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 1960).
Eighth Circuit: Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967). But see State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe,
479 F.2d 1099, 1105 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting conflict among jurisdictions and sug-
gesting that recent Supreme Court cases "tend to look favorably upon construing Section
10 [of the Act] as an affirmative grant of jurisdiction.").
96. Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967), citing Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d
912, 914 (2d Cir. 1960).
97. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
98. Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Tudicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308,
329-30 (1967); see Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326, 330-31 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d
1107, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1105
n.7 (8th Cir. 1973); Note, Judicial Review Under the Clean Air Amendments, 1976
DuKB LJ. 450, 470-72 nn.99-100. See generally K. DAvis, ADMInI TAV LAW
TREA-TIS § 23.02 (Supp. 1970).
99. See notes 44-61 supra and accompanying text.
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plicitly grant jurisdiction over such a controversy, courts have some-
times been willing to imply a private right of action.100 The decision
is based on a consideration of several factors:
(1) a Federal statutory or constitutional prohibition against the acts
complained of; (2) inclusion of the defendant in the class upon which
the duty of statutory compliance has been imposed; (3) legislative
intent to place the party claiming injury within the ambit of the stat-
ute's protection or to confer a substantive benefit or immunity upon
him; (4) injury or threatened harm proximately resulting from the
defendant's breach of duty; and (5) unavailability or ineffectiveness
of alternative avenues of redress.101
Of course, a suit based on an implied right of action under a nondisclo-
sure statute is actually nothing more than a suit brought pursuant to the
statute itself.
A nondisclosure statute which may be applicable in many reverse-
FOIA cases is section 1905 of the criminal code.1 0 2  As previously
noted, 03 this provision was obviously designed to protect the privacy
interests of those who submit information falling within its purview. The
mechanism provided to accomplish this purpose, however, is a criminal
sanction directed against offending agency employees. The statute does
not explicitly grant federal court jurisdiction over an action in which a
private party might seek to assert those rights and interests tacitly
recognized by the statute. Nevertheless, the court in Charles River
Park "A", Ic. v. HUD"° indicated that it would imply a private right
of action under section 1905 in the appropriate situation. While the
court refused to allow a private action to enjoin a violation of the
statute in that particular case, 0 5 its rationale was that such a right
should not be implied "unnecessarily"'10 in light of its decision that the
APA afforded a jurisdictional basis.' 07
One obvious problem with using any nondisclosure statute as a
jurisdictional basis for a reverse-FOIA suit is that it can be invoked only
100. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967) (action
by United States under Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964) (private remedy implicit in section 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934). But see Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (re-
fusal to permit private right of action under sections 5, 12, and 14 of FTCA). See also
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212, 213 (D.D.C. 1973).
101. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
103. See notes 44-61 supra and accompanying text.
104. 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
105. See id. at 941 n.6.
106. Id.
107. It has also been suggested in at leatt one case that section 1905 might provide
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as a basis for review of those actions which involve the type of informa-
tion which the statute purports to protect from disclosure. For instance,
even if section 1905 were held to provide jurisdiction in a reverse-FOIA
action, it could be used only in situations where the information in
question consisted of the type of trade secrets and confidential statistical
data covered by that statute. 08
(3) General federal question jurisdiction. The most promising
source of jurisdiction for a reverse-FOIA suit is the general federal
question statute, which grants jurisdiction when "the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, . . . and arises under the
Constitution or laws. . . of the United States."'1 9 One position which
has been adopted by at least -two courts is that a federal question arises
under the FOIA itself.1 0 However, this position assumes that the
exemptions are mandatory rather than permissive, since it proceeds on
the theory that the reverse-FOIA action is one to restrain a violation of
the Act itself.1 1" As shown earlier, this interpretation of the Act proves
to be erroneous on close scrutiny."12
Nevertheless, federal question jurisdiction should provide a basis
for virtually all reverse-FOIA suits. Although the precise meaning of
a basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974) (federal
question arising under the FOIA itself, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1970), and under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970)).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
110. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va.
1974); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
111. "This controversy arises under 5 U.S.C. § 552, since the plaintiff is seeking to
restrain the defendants from allegedly violating its terms." Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
112. See notes 15-40 supra and accompanying text. Another theory basing jurisdic-
tion on the FOIA itself is that a private right of action (much like that discussed earlier
in relation to specific nondisclosure statutes, see notes 99-106 supra and accompanying
text) should be inferred from the Act. In other words, if the party who has submitted
the information can show that it is exempt, he should be entitled to maintain an action
to protect his recognized right of privacy under the Act in an effort to prevent disclosure.
This theory, however, also assumes the exemptions were designed to provide affirmative
protection to a party who submits information, and the two courts which have considered
it have rejected it. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration, 384 F.
Supp. 996, 1000 (D.D.C. 1974); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 506 (W.D.
Ky. 1974). The Sears court reasoned that a reverse-FOIA plaintiff is not a party whom
the FOIA was designed to benefit and thus that the statute does not imply a private
right of action for his protection. 384 F. Supp. at 1000; cf. Renegotiation Bd. v. Banner-
craft Co., 415 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1974) (injunctive remedy explicitly provided for by confi-
dentiality exemption of FOIA is not the exclusive remedy). The Sears court distin-
guished Bannercraft as inapplicable to a litigant seeking to enjoin disclosure, since the
only right provided by the FOIA is the right to disclosure. 384 F. Supp. at 1000 n.5.
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the requirement that the action must be one which "arises under"
federal law remains unsettled for many cases that involve issues of
federal law,118 it is clear that an action, such as the reverse-FOIA suit,
which is against a federal agency to challenge federal administrative
action meets this requirement. Both the substantive basis for the action,
the right of a private party to be free from agency action which adverse-
ly affects him and is not authorized by federal law,114 and the remedy
sought, a declaratory judgment and an injunction"15 to prevent disclo-
sure, are created by federal law."1 '
The only possible difficulty which might be encountered by the
reverse-FOIA plaintiff stems from the second requirement of the statute
that the amount in controversy exceed $10,000. Usually the plaintiff
will be able to allege sufficient economic damage to meet this require-
ment, especially if the information sought to be protected is of a
financial nature. In one reverse-FOIA suit, for example, the plaintiff
argued that release of an affirmative action plan would enable a compet-
itor to estimate the company's labor costs and thereby underbid on
government contracts."17  In other situations, however, it may not be
possible to place a monetary value on the damage which would result
from disclosure of the documents in question. For instance, in situa-
113. See generally C. WRIGrr, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FPDERAL PRAcEcE AND PRO-
canuRn § 3562 (1975).
114. This form of proceeding is the most common type of nonstatutory judicial re-
view of agency action. See K. DAvis, TnxT § 23.03, at 443. 'Ihe theory and operation
of nonstatutory review are that the officer who has committed a wrong to a private indi-
vidual is answerable for his conduct unless he can establish that federal law justified
his action." Cramton 395, citing ATronNEY GENER'S COMm. O N ADMmNis'tATE
PnocEtutn, A NwmTRATI PRocEnuRE IN GOVERNMENr AGEN IEs, S. Doc. No. 8,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-82 (1941).
115. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
116. "[W]hen the claim is that the administrator has gone beyond his jurisdiction
and has sought to do something that (a federal] statute does not authorize, it has been
held that it is the proposed application of the federal statute that alone gives rise to the
action and that this makes the suit one arising under federal law." C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 113, § 3568, at 465. Specifically, the claim in any
reverse-FOIA suit is that the agency's decision to release the information in question
is an abuse of its discretionary authority or not in accordance with law. See text ac-
companying notes 42-43 supra.
117. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974). In
that case, the court concluded that the affirmative action plan would be of "marginal
utility" to a competitor, id. at 298, but this conclusion was reached after a detailed con-
sideration of the plaintiff's expert testimony. Id., at 296-98. Nevertheless, "the injury
sought to be prevented [had] been sufficiently alleged to exceed the required jurisdic-
tional amount." Id. at 294. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F.




tions where the plaintiff attempts to prevent disclosure because of
possible damage to his reputation, the interest is not readily assessable in
terms of money. It appears, however, that as a practical matter jurisdic-
tion will seldom be denied on this basis. The requirement of jurisdic-
tional amount in the area of nonstatutory review of administrative action
has been severely criticized by the commentators in recent years, 18 and
the courts appear willing to construe the requirement broadly.'"
In sum, the jurisdictional issue is no bar to any variety of reverse-
FOIA suit. An allegation that jurisdiction is provided by the APA or a
specific nondisclosure statute may be sufficient in many instances.
Where neither of these statutes is viewed as jurisdictional, it seems clear
that the reverse-FOIA action may still proceed in most cases as a form
of nonstatutory review under general federal question jurisdiction. 20
(4) The sovereign immunity defense. The relief requested in a
reverse-FOIA action is, of course, an injunction against a government
official to restrain him from making public certain information which
has been submitted to the government by a private party. When a suit
is deemed to be directed against the United States as sovereign, even
though the suit is technically against a government officer in his own
name, sovereign immunity may bar not only an action at law, but also
an equitable proceeding such as a reverse-FOIA suit.' 21
The general rule of sovereign immunity is that the government may
not be sued without its consent.' 22  The Supreme Court has delineated
those situations in which the defense generally is available in the follow-
118. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, IEXT § 23.03, at 443-44; C. WRIG=H, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 113, § 3568, at 465-67; Cramton 437-46.
119. Professor Davis states that "the books are full of cases assuming that the
$10,000 requirement does not apply to nonstatutory review of federal administrative ac-
tion." K. DAvIs, TExTr § 23.03, at 443-44.
120. Once jurisdiction has attached, the APA serves the purpose of defining "the pro-
cedures and manner of judicial review of agency action ... ." Twin Cities Chippewa
Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967) (court
does not view APA as making independent grant of jurisdiction). See note 96 supra
and accompanying text.
121. K. DAvis, Tnxr § 27.03, at 499-500. The technique of circumventing sovereign
immunity by seeking injunctive relief against a government officer originated in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), but the courts have moved away from a consistent willing-
ness to accept this legal fiction. K. DAviS, TnxT § 27.03, at 499.
122. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382, 387 (1939). There are several possible conceptual origins of the
sovereign immunity doctrine: (1) the traditional immunity of the English sovereign
deemed to have survived the American revolution; (2) the inability of the courts to en-
force a judgment against the executive without its aid; (3) the theoretical ground that
there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which that
right depends. Cramton 396-97.
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ing terms: "[A] suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with
the public administration,'. . or if the effect of the judgment would be
'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.' ,123
There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule. First, a suit for
specific relief against an officer of the sovereign is not considered a suit
against the sovereign itself if the officer was acting ultra vires.124 Sec-
ond, the defense is not available if "the statute or order conferring power
upon the officer to take action in the sovereign's name is claimed to be
unconstitutional.' 25
There seems little doubt that the relief requested by a reverse-
FOIA plaintiff will "restrain the Government from acting"'12 6 and thus
operate against the United States as sovereign. 27  Hence, the suit will
be barred unless sovereign immunity has been waived by some federal
statute or the action falls within one of the two exceptions to the
doctrine. In most cases, a reverse-FOIA plaintiff will not be in a
position to allege that the statute or regulation pursuant to which an
officer is acting in releasing information is unconstitutional. However,
the action in many cases will be one which falls within the ultra vires
exception to the rule. These are the situations wherein the plaintiff
123. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963), quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731, 738 (1947), and Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
704 (1949).
124. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).
125. Id. at 690; see Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963). However, there
is some indication that even though the officer's disputed action is allegedly ultra vires
or pursuant to an unconstitutional authority, the suit may be barred in certain circum-
stances. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), the
leading case on the current interpretation of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the Su-
preme Court stated that despite the two categories of exceptions, sovereign immunity
may bar a suit "if the relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessa-
tion of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign
or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property." Id. at 691 n.11, citing North
Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890). Obviously this limitation does not apply to
the reverse-FOIA situation, since the injunctive relief requested requires only "cessation
of the conduct" of releasing information, not "affirmative action."
The cases and commentators have disputed the construction and correctness of Lar-
son's footnote 11. See, e.g., Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1974)
(construing footnote 11 as recognizing that sovereign immunity may bar suit in excep-
tional cases, for example, where to do otherwise would impose "an intolerable burden
on governmental functions"); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir.
1969) (taking position that footnote 11 was not intended to preclude all suits for af-
firmative relief); K. Dvis, Texr 501; Cramton 414.
126. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
127. See, e.g., Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (action to join enforcement of increased parcel post zone rates).
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alleges that disclosure is contrary to a federal statute or regulation. It
should be noted, however, that not all statutes or regulations of this type
will be sufficient to satisfy the exception. The Supreme Court in
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.2 8 made it clear that the
ultra vires exception is not satisfied by a mere "claim of error in the
exercise" of power granted to a government official. 129 Rather, it is
necessary that the complaint set forth a particular statutory (or regulato-
ry'3 0) limitation since "the relief can be granted, without impleading the
sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power."''1 The
applicability of the ultra vires exception is most clear in a case where
statutory authority is limited in absolute terms,3 2 but the courts have
also been willing to grant relief when the statutory mandate merely sets
forth standards with which the officer must comply.'33 Thus, an allega-
tion should be sufficient to satisfy the ultra vires exception if it states
128. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
129. Id. at 690.
130. Regulatory limitations have the force of law as against the agencies which
promulgated them. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
131. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949); see
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1963) (since statutory power involved "had no
limitation placed upon it by the Congress," ultra vires exception not satisfied). The
commentators have severely criticized the distinction between "error" and "general au-
thority" posed in Larson's definition of the ultra vires exception. See, e.g., Byse, Pro-
posed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Tudicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, In-
dispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HAZv. L, REv. 1479, 1490-91 (1962) ('The vice of
Larson .. . is that [it permits] . .. courts to shirk the hard task of determining the
limits of official power."); Cramton 407 (the distinction "has been applied to deprive
litigants of judicial consideration of their claim that an officer's conduct is unlawful").
132. See Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 279 (7th Cir. 1974) (sufficient allegation
that action was ultra vires where complaint stated that conditions precedent to termina-
tion of federal assistance as set forth in statute had not been satisfied); Washington v.
Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1969) (court emphasized that statute stated
absolutely that a certain 160-acre limitation was to be included in particular contracts).
133. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (challenge of authority of officer to interpret revenue statute in manner con-
trary to long-established congressional policy was within ultra vires exception); State
Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (court construed Fed-
eral-Aid Highway Act to determine that officer had no express or implied authority to
impound funds for purposes not related to Act itself). But see Doehla Greeting Cards,
Inc. v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (court held ultra vires exception in-
applicable even though postal law in question set forth standards to be observed by Post-
master General in taking action at issue). The result in Summerfield has been criti-
cized in Byse, supra note 131, at 1489-90; Cramton 407-08; Comment, Immunity of
Government Officers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8 STAx. L. Rv. 683 (1956). "0Tihe
merits as so defined will never be litigated at all if the court construes the statute to
give the defendant 'prima facie' authority for his acts." Id. at 690. See generally Social
Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) ("An agency may not finally decide
the limits of its statutory power."); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944).
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that by disclosing information an officer will exceed the bounds of his
authority as delineated by a statute or regulation which sets forth criteria
for determining when particular information is to be withheld.
In a reverse-FOIA action based solely on review of agency discre-
tion,'" on the other hand, the ultra vires exception is of no help in
circumventing sovereign immunity. Nor do the statutes granting sub-
ject matter jurisdiction13 and mandamus relief'36 waive sovereign im-
munity in actions to which they apply.'3" Nevertheless, it can be argued
that the courts should not invoke sovereign immunity to bar a reverse-
FOIA action which alleges abuse of agency discretion. As previously
noted, the reverse-FOLA action is based on the APA.35  In other cases
where the Act has provided the basis of an action which seeks injunctive
relief against a government official, several circuit courts have explicitly
held that the sovereign immunity doctrine is avoided or restricted, and
the Supreme Court has pointedly avoided the question.
The Supreme Court's approach to the issue of sovereign immunity
has developed in two independent lines of cases. One line, headed by
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,3 9 relies on a detailed
and technical discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine with no
mention of the effect, if any, of the APA and its underlying policies on
an action against a government officer.' 40  The prevailing viewpoint
expressed in these cases is that "[tihere are the strongest reasons of
public policy for the rule that [injunctive] relief cannot be had against
1,34. Agencies are granted authority to release documents by section 301, 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1970), or by specific enabling legislation. See notes 62-63 supra and accompany-
ing text.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
136. 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Id. § 1361.
137. Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1972) (section 1331); Mc-
Queary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir. 1971) (section 1361); Professional &
Technical Eng'rs Local 1 v. Williams, 389 F. Supp. 287, 290 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 510
F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1975) (section 1361); Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362
F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (W.D. Ky. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 1390 (1975) (sections 1331, 1361); Massachusetts v. Connor, 248
F. Supp. 656, 660 (D. Mass.), affd, 366 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1966) (section 1361);
Smith v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 402, 404 (D. Wyo. 1963), affd, 333 F.2d 70
(10th Cir. 1964) (section 1361).
138. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
139. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
140. Yee Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Each of these cases was decided after enactment
of the APA in 1946.
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the sovereign. The Government, as representative of the community as
a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a
disputed question of property or contract right."'41 The second line of
cases, of which Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe142 is repre-
sentative, explores the technicalities and restrictions of the APA without
any discussion of the role of sovereign immunity in actions for review of
agency discretion. 43 Furthermore, the latter cases take the expansive
view that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a
contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial
review."'14 4 These two trends could perhaps be reconciled by assuming
that the APA constitutes a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity but
that the Act was inapplicable in the first line of cases. 45  However,
dictum in one Supreme Court decision states that the APA is not to be
"deemed an implied waiver of all governmental immunity from suit."' 46
Not surprisingly the circuit courts are in conflict as to the applica-
bility of the sovereign immunity doctrine in cases governed by the APA.
Several courts have held that the Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign
immunity in any action to which it applies. 47 In these jurisdictions, of
course, no reverse-FOIA suit will be dismissed on the ground of sover-
eign immunity, since the sovereign is deemed to have consented to any
such suit.
141. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949). In-
deed, the case of United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941), is still being cited
by the lower courts for the proposition that "[elvery declaration of a waiver of sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed." Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 497
F.2d 1172, 1176 (6th Cir. 1974).
142. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
143. See id.; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967).
144. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), citing Rusk V. Cort,
369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962). Of course, even though the Court in the quoted passage
was referring to the issue of statutory preclusion of review, rather than sovereign immun-
ity, the statement evidences a strong presumption in favor of judicial review.
145. The court in Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (4th Cir. 197-1), noted
this possible path of reconciliation.
146. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 516 (1952). It is possible that the Supreme
Court may supply further guidance on the sovereign immunity issue in an APA case
when it decides Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1390 (1975). The question which has been certified is
whether sovereign immunity bars an action to enforce a Clean Air Act implementation
program against government officials. 44 U.S.L.W. 3031 (July 22, 1975).
147. The Second and District of Columbia Circuits presently take this view. Scan-
well Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kletschka
v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit at one time espoused
the waiver theory, Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 34-35 (9th Cir. 1958), but has since
abandoned that position. Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Even in the circuits which hold that the APA does not imply such a
waiver, 148 however, an action governed by the Act may not be barred by
the sovereign immunity doctrine. Two courts from this group have
taken the position that in an action where both the APA and the
sovereign immunity defense are applicable, sovereign immunity will not
bar the action unless "the reasons for its application [are] so compelling
as to require dismissal of the case despite the APA.''14' This view is
illustrated by the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Littell v. Morton.50
In this case, review was granted even though sovereign immunity was
applicable and the case was not within an exception, since the relief
requested' 5" posed no danger that the government would be "stopped in
its tracks" or that -an "important government project [would be] halted
pending litigation.' 52  After specifically noting the line of Supreme
Court cases in which review was granted under the APA without
discussion of sovereign immunity, 53 and with reference to the vehement
criticism which the commentators have leveled against the sovereign
immunity doctrine, 54 the court observed:
The Fifth Circuit is in a state of confusion, having adopted the waiver theory in Estrada
v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1961), retreated from that position without ex-
pressly overruling it in Colson v. H-ickel, 428 F.2d 1046 (Sth.Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 911 (1971), and declined to reconcile the two in Warner v. Cox, 487 F.2d
1301, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). However, the court in Cox did hold that any waiver which
the Act might provide "does not extend so far as an action... for money." Id.
148. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 1972); Littell v. Morton,
445 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (4th Cir. 1971); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th
Cir. 1969); Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1968); Twin Cities Chip-
pewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 ( th Cir. 1967);
Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d 416, 417 (Ist Cir. 1955).
149. Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1213 (4th Cir. 1971); see Washington v.
Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1969) ("In any case wherein the immunity doc-
trine is so transcending as to require dismissal of the suit, the Act does not provide for
Administrative Review."). Littell purports to adopt the formulation of the Udall court
for reconciling the APA and the sovereign immunity doctrine. 445 F.2d at 1213. How-
ever, it is not clear that the Ninth Circuit would go so far as the Fourth in striking
a balance which favors review. The Ninth Circuit in Udall had found the ultra vires
exception applicable and resolved the sovereign immunity question on that basis. Thus
it is impossible to tell when the court would find a sovereign immunity consideration
"so transcending as to require dismissal." 417 F.2d at 1320.
150. 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
151. The plaintiff demanded payment for professional services rendered to the Nav-
ajo Tribe, to which he was allegedly entitled under a contract with the Department of
the Interior. Id. at 1209-10.
152. Id. at 1214.
153. Id. at 1212.
154. See, e.g., IL DAvs, TEr §§ 27.01-.07; Byse, supra note 131, at 1484-93; Cram-
ton 389-436; Comment, supra note 133. In October, 1969, a proposed amendment of
the APA, which would in essence have abolished sovereign immunity in suits for specific
relief, was adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States and the Ad-
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The rationale for sovereign immunity essentially boils down to sub-
stantial bothersome interference with the operation of government.
It can be said with some justification that both Congress, through the
enactment of the APA, and the courts, through liberal application of
the APA and silence as to sovereign immunity, have largely rejected
this rationale.' 55
The commentators are in agreement158 that the only remaining
substantial rationale for the sovereign immunity doctrine is the fear of
interference with government operations by litigious plaintiffs. The
Littell formulation succeeds in preserving this essential protective char-
acteristic of sovereign immunity while avoiding a formalistic application
of the doctrine which would thwart the favorable attitude toward allow-
ing judicial review of agency action evidenced by the line of cases giving
an expansive construction to the APA. If, in line with the Supreme
Court's dictum, the APA is deemed not to waive sovereign immunity in
all cases to which the Act applies, the solution presented by Littell
seems the most reasonable.
A reverse-FOIA case is an ideal example of a situation in which
judicial review is appropriate. The interests of a private party in
preserving confidentiality of information are to be balanced against the
interests of the public (or more narrowly, the requesting party) in
disclosure. 157  The agency's interest is minimal, 58 since its role is only
that of primary intermediary, with the delegated task of initially balanc-
ing the interests of extra-governmental parties. Accordingly, since a
court order to withhold certain documents will hardly "stop the govern-
ment in its tracks,"' 59 sovereign immunity should not bar even a reverse-
FOTA action based solely on review of agency discretion.8 0
INADEQUACY OF THE REVRsE-FOIA SuIT
In spite of the apparent availability of theoretical bases for the
reverse-FOIA suit, such an action may not in fact be adequate in a
ministrative Law Section of the American Bar Association. The proposal was adopted
in principle by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in February,
1970. K. DAvis, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 98, § 27.00-8, at 216.
155. 445 F.2d at 1214.
156. K. DAVIs, TExr § 27.02, at 498; Block, Suits Against Government Officers and
the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1946); Byse, supra
note 131, at 1484; Cramton 397.
157. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
158. In any situation giving rise to a reverse-FOIA suit, the agency has already deter-
mined that the government itself has no interest in retention of the information.
159. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
160. The strongest argument the government could make for application of the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine would be the claim that each reverse-FOIA suit interferes with
the agency's execution of the policy of total disclosure mandated by the FOIA itself.
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substantial number of cases to protect the interests of a party who has
submitted information to the government and retains some right of
confidentiality. Under the FOIA as amended in 1974, the government
is required to respond to a request for information within ten days for
original requests and twenty days for administrative appeals of deni-
als.les The Act neither makes provision, nor allows sufficient time, for
notification of the party who has submitted the information to the
agency of a decision to release the documents. 162 Thus, information
may be made public and damage done without an interested party's
knowledge of the release.
There are two possible remedies for this situation. In order to
prevent such a release, an interested party might consider bringing an
action shortly after submitting documents to an agency for an injunction
against any release of the papers or a declaratory judgment that such
release would constitute an abuse of agency discretion. However, if the
information has already been released, one might sue for damages
caused by the negligent or wrongful release of the documents.
Declaratory or Injunctive Relief
The courts traditionally evaluate two factors in determining wheth-
er to grant injunctive or declaratory relief: the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision, and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.10 3 The main obstacle to the plaintiff who seeks these
remedies to protect information submitted to an agency is that the
controversy may not yet be ripe for judicial resolution. 164  If no request
161. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A) (Supp. 1976).
162. Cf. DEP'T OF Jusrica, ATiro NEY GENr RL's MEMORANDUM ON THE Puuuc IN-
FORMATION SECTION OF THE ADmNrSTATWrE PRocErDuu Acr 34 (1967) ("there may
be instances when agencies will find it appropriate to consult with the person who pro-
vided the information before deciding whether the exemption applies" (emphasis
added)).
Some agencies, however, have developed a formal policy of consulting the party
who submitted the information when the applicability of an FOIA exemption is a possi-
bility. The regulations of the Food and Drug Administration provide:
In situations where the confidentiality of data or information is uncertain and
there is a request for public disclosure, the Food and Drug Administration will
consult with the person who has submitted or divulged the data or information
or who would be affected by disclosure before determining whether or not such
data or information is available for public disclosure. 21 C.F.R. § 4.45
(1975).
Still, the submitting party is dependent on the agency to determine when confidentiality
is "uncertain."
163. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 14849 (1967).
164. See id.
[The] basic rationale [of ripeness] is to prevent the courts, through avoidance
of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree-
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has yet been made for release of the information, the agency obviously
will not have decided, formally or informally, whether or not disclosure
of the particular document is proper-in a sense there is not yet a real
controversy. The APA'15 imposes a "ripeness" requirement which is
operationally equivalent to the courts' generalized criteria of justiciabili-
ty.16 Section 10(c) of the APA states that judicial review may only be
exercised over "final agency action."10 7
Considerations of ripeness led the court in McCoy v. Weinbergerl s
to preclude the plaintiff from certifying a class action for injunction
against release of yearly cost reports furnished by hospitals and skilled
nursing homes pursuant to the Medicare program.'8 9 Since the pros-
pective members of the class were institutions which were not "in
immediate danger of having their cost reports released to competitive
nursing homes or other members of the general public," the court
determined that ordering a generally applicable injunction would be
"inappropriate.' 170
Thus, if the plaintiff merely fears that an agency in its own
discretion may release FOIA-exempt information in the future, his
action for declaratory' 71 or injunctive 72 relief will probably be barred
both by the APA, 7 s and by the courts' reluctance to review issues not
ments over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from ju-
dicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
166. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Smith, 293 F. Supp. 1111, 11,15 .(S.I5.N.Y. 1968) (familiar
principle that courts are reluctant to intervene when agency proceedings are at inter-
mediate stage embodied in section ,10(c) of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970)).
167. Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial re-
view. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
168. 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
169. Id. at 508.
170. Id. Similarly, in Westinghouse the court refused the plaintiffs' request for a de-
claratory judgment that disclosure of any employment information report or affirmative
action plan is prohibited. Such relief, reasoned the court, would necessarily cover in-
formation yet to be prepared which might not be truly confidential. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (E.D. Va. 1974).
171. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970) (claim for declaratory relief not ripe for adjudication when challenge is of
rule merely proposed by agency).
172. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Smith, 293 F. Supp. 1111, 1113-14, 1115-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (court refused injunction against further action on applications for licenses from
Foreign Trade Zones Board since no final or intermediate orders or regulations had been
announced).
173. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
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yet ripe.174  However, if the agency has issued a regulation which
specifies that a particular type of document will be released on re-
quest,'715 the issue of whether such disclosure is contrary to law or an
abuse of discretion may well be fit for judicial decision.' 7 6 In such a
case the issues are concrete and the controversy is fixed by the agency's
formal willingness to disclose particular data.
The second factor the courts evaluate in determining whether
declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate is the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration. 7 7  Irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies are additional prerequisites to injunctive
relief.17  It seems that the "hardship" standard, at least, should be met.
The plaintiff is faced with the dilemma of either withholding confiden-
tial information and suffering whatever sanctions result, or submitting
the data and risking that it may be released without sufficient notice to
allow him to challenge the agency action before harm is done.1 9 Wheth-
er or not a plaintiff can meet the irreparable harm standard depends, of
174. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Smith, 293 F. Supp. 11111, 1113-14, 1115-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
175. In McCoy the court noted that although the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare had stated he planned to adopt new regulations to allow disclosure of reports
such as that the plaintiff had furnished, he had not yet taken that step. McCoy v. Wein-
berger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 508 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
176. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967) (regulation is-
sued by FDA as to particular drug labeling and advertising challenged as beyond author-
ity given by Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-issue deemed appropriate for judicial re-
view); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 198 (1956) (challenge
of FCC regulation stating policy that license applicant already owning five licenses
would not be issued another-reviewable as "final agency action").
177. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
178, Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974).
179. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967) (sufficient
"hardship" that plaintiffs had either to incur cost of changing promotional material and
labeling or risk prosecution). But see Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 37
AD. L.2D 447 (D.D.C. 1975), in which the plaintiff sought an injunction to compel the
FDA to provide some notice to affected drug companies before releasing material from
"new drug application" files to the public. Id. at 450. The court denied an injunction
pendente lite, concluding that:
The plaintiff here is not seeking to prevent the disclosure of specific informa-
tion which has been requested under FOIA provisions. Rather, what it seeks
to prevent is some type of speculative future harm-the possibility of accidental
disclosure in the future of unidentified confidential information. Id. at 453.
The record in the case, however, showed that the applicable FDA regulations, 21 C.F.R.
§ 4.45 (1975), which required notice to be given to drug manufacturers before informa-
tion from new drug files was released, had been interpreted by the Commissioner to re-
quire notice in all cases except when the material was "clearly disclosable under law."
37 AD. L.2d at 453, quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 44,609, 62 (1974) (emphasis by the court).
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course, upon the type of injury he expects to result from disclosure of
the confidential materials' s8
Action for Damages
In an action for damages against an agency which has already
released exempt information, the plaintiff is squarely confronted by the
obstacle of sovereign immunity. A waiver of sovereign immunity is not
available through the APA 181 since that statute does not apply to actions
for damages. 8 2 Moreover, if the plaintiff's complaint sounds in the tort
of interference with contract or that of interference with prospective
business advantage, the action is precluded by the Federal Tort Claims
Act.' 88
However, at least two situations exist iA which an action for
damages may be successful. First, if the party who submitted the
information had entered into an express or implied agreement with the
government agency that the data were not to be released to the public,18 4
he could maintain an action for damages on that contract.185
Second, the party may be able to recover if he can show that an
agency employee was negligent in releasing the information in question.
Suppose a party claims he was injured by an agency employee's negli-
gence in executing a statute or regulation' (subject to the restriction as
to interference with contract or interference with prospective business
advantage actions mentioned above). The Federal Tort Claims Act
would preclude such an action if the employee were performing a
"discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discretion
180. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 37 AD. L.2D 447, 453 (not
certain that injury, if it did occur, would be irreparable). See note 179 supra.
181. See notes 146 & 148 supra and accompanying text.
182. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
183. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1976); see, eg., Taxay v. United States, 345 F.
Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (interference
with prospective business advantage); Pargament v. Fitzgerald, 272 F. Supp. 553, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 391 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968) (interference with contract).
184. For a discussion of such agreements, see note 80 supra and accompanying text.
185. Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1968)
(waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to express contracts and contracts implied
in fact but not as to contracts implied or founded on equitable principles); Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (court would allow con-
tract action against United States for unauthorized use of trade secrets); Padbloc Co.
v. United States, 161 Ct. C1. 369, 388-89, 412-13 (1963) (recovery for breach of confi-
dentiality clause of contract with Army Chemical Corps); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)
(1970).
186. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2680(a) (1970).
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involved [was] abused.' 87  Clearly, if the plaintiff is alleging only that
disclosure constituted an "abuse of discretion," the third type of reverse-
FOIA suit, this discretionary duty exception will apply and sovereign
immunity will bar the suit for damages. If, however, the plaintiff is
able to claim that disclosure violates a statute or regulation, the action
will be barred only if the statute or regulation delegates a "discretionary
function" to the employee. 88 The test for distinguishing a discretion-
ary function is to analyze "not merely whether judgment was exercised
but also whether the nature of the judgment called for policy considera-
tions."' 89 This test is obviously inexact, and "each case. . . must stand
on its own record."'9 °  Yet at least in one situation, recovery clearly
should be permitted: if a statute or regulation specifically forbids disclo-
sure of a specifically identified type of document, for example, the tax
code section restricting release of tax returns,' 9 ' agency employees need
make no "policy judgments as to the public interest"'19 2 and their ac-
tions should be reviewable in an action at law. 93
CONCLUSION
Without a judicial remedy, those who furnish information pursuant
to a government regulatory scheme or as a requisite to obtaining agency-
administered benefits seemingly lose all control over the disposition of
that data. As federal programs proliferate, such parties may increasingly
abandon privacy interests and fall prey to individuals and corporations
that are learning to use the FOIA for ferreting out data not about
government operations but about private individuals.9 4
The reverse-FOIA action, in its several forms, provides a means for
a private party to minimize the privacy rights he inevitably relinquishes
187. Id. § 2680(a).
188. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27 (1953).
189. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974); see Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953).
190. Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964).
191. INT. REV. CODE Op 1954 § 6103. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying
text.
192. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974).
193. See id. (regulation calling for comparative analysis of polio vaccine based on
specific criteria does not require exercise of "discretion"); cf. Hendry v. United States,
418 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1969) (malpractice claim not barred by Federal Tort Claims
Act); Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 350 U.S. 907, modified, 350 U.S. 962 (1955) (air traffic tower operators
not performing discretionary acts).
194. See Arnold, Who's Going Fishing in Government Files, 6 JumIs DocrOR 17
(Apr. 1976).
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in surrendering information to the government, within the statutory
constraints requiring full disclosure of non-exempt documents. The
adequacy of this remedy, however, is substantially reduced to the extent
that the private party does not receive notice of impending release of
information he has submitted, and consequently loses any reliable op-
portunity to challenge agency action.
